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Institutional differences between countries influence strategic choices and performance of international busi
nesses, but the unintended effects of legal institutions on firm legitimacy have received less attention. We argue
that, while minority shareholder rights protection in an investment location does not directly protect shareholder
interests abroad, the normative and mimetic effects it has on host country managers can mitigate agency
problems. Using Japanese FDI established between 1986 and 2013 we find that (a) subsidiaries established in
host countries with higher shareholder rights protection employ a smaller proportion of Japanese expatriates, (b)
shareholder rights protection enhances a country’s FDI attractiveness, and (c) that the impacts of shareholder
rights protection on expatriate ratio and location attractiveness are stronger when firm ownership is concen
trated among exchange-listed firms. This research contributes to the literature on institutional difference in
international business, in particular by highlighting the value of studying the imprinting effects of regulations.

1. Introduction
Differences between home and host country institutional environ
ments shape foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions including location
choice and entry mode, and outcomes such as performance and survival
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Trapczynski & Banalieva, 2016; Zaheer,
Nachum, & Schomaker, 2012). Formal institutional differences (i.e.
legal and regulatory environments) increase the complexity of managing
foreign subsidiaries (Cuypers, Hennart, Silverman, & Ertug, 2021;
Dunning, 1988) and both formal and informal (i.e. cultural) institutional
environments necessitate strategic adaption (Chuck & Solomon, 2006).
Institutional similarities, on the other hand, ease the diffusion of MNEs’
knowledge and practices between headquarters and subsidiaries (Kos
tova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002).
Building on prior research (Kostova, Beugelsdijk, Scott, Kunst, Chua,
& van Essen, 2020) we argue that formal regulations can create informal
institutional pressures on decision-making in the MNE. Specifically,
minority shareholder rights (SHR) protection lowers the risk of mana
gerial misappropriation of firm assets due to imprinting effects on host
country management norms and practices (Konara & Shirodkar, 2018;
Popli, Raithatha, & Fuad, 2021; Stinchcombe, 1965). As a result, the
MNE prefers FDI locations with stronger SHR protection (Globerman &
Shapiro, 2003; Lskavyan & Spatareanu, 2011), and uses fewer expatriate

managers to staff subsidiaries in these locations. Since MNE governance
is influenced by SHR in the home country, we predict that its relation
ships with subsidiary staffing and location attractiveness are stronger
when a greater share of the subsidiary is owned by exchange-listed
firms.
We test our hypotheses on Japanese overseas subsidiaries founded
during the period 1986–2013. Using fractional regression, implemented
via heteroskedastic probit modelling, we find a negative relationship
between host-country SHR and the ratio of Japanese expatriates to total
employees of the foreign subsidiary. Using mixed-effects discrete choice
modeling techniques, we consequently find that countries with stronger
SHR are more likely to be chosen for investment. Finally, expatriate ratio
is lower, while locations are more attractive to FDI, when there is a
greater share of subsidiary ownership held by Japanese parent firm
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). This latter finding reinforces
our argument that the impact of formal regulations diffuses to shape
management norms for the country.
This research extends prior research on the relationship between
SHR and location choice (e.g. Baulkaran & Lupton, 2020; Globerman &
Shapiro, 2003; Wang, Alba, & Park, 2012) and further probes how it
impacts an MNE’s subsidiary staffing practices (Guillén & Capron,
2016). In particular, we introduce mimetic and normative pressures as
mechanisms explaining why SHR congruence between home and host
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FDI countries impacts FDI, despite the fact that foreign shareholders are
outside the jurisdiction of the laws in question. We further demonstrate
that coercive pressures in the FDI home country interact with those
normative and mimetic forces in the host country to enhance the FDIattractiveness of SHR and expatriate staffing levels. This research con
tributes to the call to consider the impact of institutional environments
on international business from multiple institutional lenses (Kostova
et al., 2020; Shin, Hasse, & Schotter, 2017). We also contribute to recent
research that has highlighted the need to distinguish public from private
expropriation risk in international business decisions (Sartor & Beamish,
2019), by demonstrating that MNE concerns for retaining control over
foreign subsidiaries through expatriate deployment may be alleviated by
strong SHR protection in the host country. Finally, our findings have
implications for MNE investors and policymakers on how host country
SHR can attract FDI while increasing opportunities for local manage
ment talent.

for gaining legitimacy and easing access to resources, while in institu
tional economics, the goal is to economize on transaction costs.
Comparative institutionalism is less relevant in this study, being pri
marily concerned with the categorization and performance of political
economies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998).
Organizational institutionalism (OI) acknowledges that the firm is
embedded within a social context that influences its behavior, perfor
mance and survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008). The MNE is
embedded in multiple social contexts (Saka-Helmhout, Deeg, & Green
wood, 2016), and MNE subsidiaries are dually embedded in their local
and MNE environments (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996; Oehmichen &
Puck, 2016). According to OI, MNEs face a liability of foreignness
(Coviello, Kano, & Liesch, 2017; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) which
complicates embedding and legitimation, threatening firm survival
through resource attraction problems and performance decline. The
institutional forces influencing firms are divided into regulatory
(responding to coercive pressures), cognitive (inducing imitation of
exemplars) and normative (conforming to widely accepted practices)
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008).
Institutional economics (IE) views legal and normative pressures as
forming the ‘rules of the game’ for business, which shape MNE location
preferences and transaction modes (Buckley, 2009; Dunning, 2000;
North, 1990). According to IE theories, such as transaction cost eco
nomics and agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson, 1985), the
main drivers of MNE behaviors, governance modes and performance are
the costs of negotiation, monitoring and enforcing contracts (Cuypers
et al., 2021; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011), rather than the legitimacy and
embedding processes of OI (Suchman, 1995). Intuitively, an IE
perspective sheds light on why SHR is attractive to FDI, but we argue
that legal mechanisms are limited to the extent that shareholders are
outside the jurisdiction of the laws. Hence, we combine insights from IE
and OI perspectives to explain the impact of SHR on the behavior of the
MNE. Fig. 1 graphically depicts the complementary influences of

2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1. Institutional differences in international business
International business is fundamentally concerned with the man
agement of physical and institutional distances (Zaheer et al., 2012).
Three theoretical perspectives on institutional distance – i.e. the
contextual differences between countries originating in social, cultural,
legal, historical and economic systems – have been influential in
explaining international business location, decision-making and per
formance (Kostova et al., 2020). These are organizational institution
alism, institutional economics, and comparative institutionalism. Both
organizational institutionalism and institutional economics are con
cerned with how the degree of congruence between the internal and
external governance environments influence MNE behavior. According
to organizational institutionalism, these behaviors are based on the need

MNE Host Country

Minority shareholder
rights protection

MNE Home Country

Congruence

Minority shareholder
rights protection

Listed MNE HQ
management

Unaffiliated local
firm management

Isomorphic
pressure

Isomorphic
pressure

MNE subsidiary
management

Expatriate deployment (H1) and location
attractiveness (H2)

Private MNE HQ
management

Fig. 1. The regulatory and normative roles of shareholder rights protection (SHR) on subsidiary staffing and location.
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country and firm institutional environments on the staffing and location
of MNE subsidiaries.

2.3. FDI location attractiveness of shareholder rights protection
Unlike expatriate staffing, the reason why MNEs prefer stronger SHR
protection is less obvious. Lskavyan and Spatareanu (2011) debated
whether weaker shareholder protection would either encourage more
FDI, due to less stringent monitoring, or discourage it due to increased
agency costs. Yet, these authors and others (Globerman & Shapiro,
2003; Guillén & Capron, 2016) have found that SHR is attractive to FDI,
based on its ability to mitigate expropriation risk. We argue that this
association is due to isomorphic forces rather than regulatory pressures.
Implementing and enforcing MNE governance practices in foreign sub
sidiaries can be hampered by local norms related to managerial per
quisites, nepotism, and weak control of corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra,
2016; Rabbiosi & Santangelo, 2019; Yi, Meng, Macaulay, & Peng, 2019).
Additionally, mechanisms to align the interest of subsidiary managers
with shareholders of the MNE can be costly to implement and ineffective
due to information asymmetries arising from institutional duality (Kim
et al., 2018; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Hence, monitoring and enforcing
employment contracts is less costly when local management practices
are aligned with MNE interests.
Our argument that MNEs will employ fewer expatriates to countries
with stronger SHR protection also implies that, other things equal, those
locations will be more attractive, given the incremental costs of expa
triate deployment, such as wage premiums. Furthermore, a higher de
gree of SHR confers legitimacy to the location for the purpose of direct
investment (Peng, 2012; Rabbiosi & Santangelo, 2019). We predict that
legitimacy, combined with economizing on governance costs, improves
the odds that an MNE will select a location for investment.

2.2. Shareholder rights protection (SHR) and subsidiary staffing
According to OI, organizations face coercive, normative and cogni
tive pressures for conformance (Scott, 2008). In the current study, co
ercive forces shape subsidiary governance through the laws and
regulatory bodies in the host country, in addition to policies imposed by
the MNE. Normative pressures arising from the broader social context
influence subsidiary managers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of varying
management practices (Deephouse, Bundy, Tost, & Suchman, 2017).
Finally, cognitive pressures can shape behavior where coercive and
normative pressures are absent or equivocal. When in doubt, subsidiary
managers rely on their own and others’ experience to guide their
governance practices. To the extent that MNE subsidiary HR practices
are embedded within their local context, they will conform with host
country norms (Björkman, Fey, & Park, 2007).
MNEs span institutional boundaries (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999)
creating the problem of institutional duality for foreign subsidiaries
embedded within both local and MNE contexts. This is evident in sub
sidiaries’ responses to political activity (Hillman & Wan, 2005),
increased difficulty in transferring complex knowledge between MNE
subunits (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Minbaeva, Pedersen, Björkman, Fey, &
Park, 2003) and implementing MNE initiatives abroad (Beddewela,
2019). Subsidiary managers’ priorities are influenced by their home
country institutions, including government, education, and those of
customers, suppliers, and peers. Hence, creating pressures for subsidiary
isomorphism, which may conflict with MNE headquarter interests.
Deploying expatriates from the headquarter country to the local
subsidiary is a common approach to mitigating information asymmetry,
undesirable autonomy, and subsidiary isolation (Gaur, Delios, & Singh,
2007). Expatriates have a better understanding of MNE strategy, the
intended role of the subsidiary, and the MNE’s governance practices
(Gong, 2003). Hence, expatriates can be effective in transferring MNEs’
shareholder-friendly governance practices (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Due
to the relative ease with which knowledge and MNE practices are
transferred, expatriate deployment is a common tactic in subsidiary
governance (Brock, Shenkar, Shoham, & Siscovick, 2008; Meyer, Li, &
Schotter, 2020; Shin et al., 2017). In the absence of regulatory oversight
from the MNE headquarters, subsidiaries may gravitate towards prac
tices more common in the host country (Kim, Kim, Marshall, & Afzali,
2018). This is because mimetic isomorphism (i.e. conforming to
normative and cognitive expectations) within the local environment
confers legitimacy from the perspective of host country stakeholders
(Banerjee & Venaik, 2018; Chapman, Sisk, Schatten, & Miles, 2018).
Where local isomorphic pressures are high, the MNE’s control over the
subsidiary’s behavior may wane (Beddewela, 2019). Deploying expa
triate managers can mitigate this hazard (Rickley & Karim, 2018), but
adds substantial management costs (Roth & O’Donnell, 1996; Suutari &
Tornikoski, 2001).
With more stringent SHR, we expect that local management practices
will become more aligned with MNE headquarters. Since the regulatory
environment already favors shareholder rights, it exerts pressure on
local managers to align with shareholders, thus reducing the need and
cost of monitoring. Thus, in the absence of any other pressures, man
agers will be more likely to conform to their initial conditioning. This
occurs naturally through imprinting, in which cognitive frames are
created and guide interpretations of appropriate management practices
(Konara & Shirodkar, 2018; Stinchcombe, 1965). Hence, we predict that
in host countries with higher shareholder rights protection, MNEs will
dispatch fewer expatriates:

Hypothesis 2. All else equal, the strength of shareholder rights protection
increases the attractiveness of a potential host country for JFDI.
2.4. Japanese listed MNE ownership, subsidiary staffing, and location
attractiveness
We have predicted that MNEs will use fewer expatriates in propor
tion to total employees when SHR protection is higher (Hypothesis 1)
and are thus more likely to invest in countries with higher SHR (Hy
pothesis 2). Both predictions are consistent with the more generalized
finding that firms gravitate towards environments similar to those at
home (Mingo, Junkunc, & Morales, 2018; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010).
A key assumption of our predictions is that the Japanese MNE gover
nance practices are influenced by SHR regulations at home, and these
practices also shape staffing policies abroad. This assumption is
consistent with prior research which demonstrates that MNEs align with
regulatory pressures from their home countries (Barnard & Luiz, 2018;
Martínez-Ferrero & García-Sánchez, 2017) and are thus align with
shareholder interests when investing abroad. Here we argue that regu
latory (i.e. coercive) pressures on governance practices are more influ
ential on MNEs than the normative and mimetic pressures, because
coercive forces precede the normative diffusion of managerial practices
through socialization pressures (see Fig. 1, “isomorphic pressures”).
Publicly listed MNEs face greater coercive pressures because they are
regulated by legal institutions which protect shareholders’ claims to the
assets of the firm and their use in FDI (Lien & Filatotchev, 2015; Lien,
Piesse, Strange, & Filatotchev, 2005). However, not all MNEs are pub
licly held, and consequently don’t face the same degree of regulatory
pressure to conform with shareholder interests. Hence, it follows that if
Japanese MNEs prefer governance practices that favor minority share
holder interests, this preference will be stronger for listed companies
compared to non-listed companies.
Alignment between shareholders and managers in international
business can be achieved through equity ownership of foreign whollyowned subsidiaries and international joint ventures (Filatotchev &
Wright, 2011). However, we argue that strong SHR protection in both
the home and host FDI country results can further align shareholder and

Hypothesis 1. The strength of host-country shareholder rights protection is
negatively related to the proportion of Japanese expatriate managers in
Japanese foreign subsidiaries.
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manger interests, as a result of imprinting (Konara & Shirodkar, 2018;
Stinchcombe, 1965). Hence, MNEs without shareholders still prefer
countries with stronger SHR protection, but not to the same extent as
listed firms.
Listed ownership by Japanese firms is a continuum, as subsidiaries
can be jointly owned by more than one parent firm, including combi
nations of listed and unlisted firms. Hence, to further test the assumption
that SHR influences MNEs’ use of expatriates, we predict that the
negative relationship between SHR and expatriate ratio will be stronger
(more negative) when the proportion of the subsidiary owned by TSElisted Japanese firms is higher (Hypothesis 3). Likewise, we predict
that the relationship between SHR and location attractiveness will be
stronger when ownership by listed firms is higher (Hypothesis 4).

to observe time-varying measures of SHR effectiveness and other loca
tion attributes known to influence FDI location decisions. Of particular
importance to our study, we are able to obtain subsidiary-specific data to
calculate the Japanese expatriate to total employee ratio and the
ownership share of Japanese parent firms which are listed on the TSE.
3.2. Dependent variables
3.2.1. Expatriate ratio
For hypotheses 1 and 3, the dependent variable is Japanese expa
triate ratio defined as the number of Japanese employees dispatched to
each subsidiary divided by the total number of employees. Both of these
variables are time-varying indicators obtained from the TK database.

Hypothesis 3. The negative relationship between host-country SHR and
Japanese expatriate ratio is strengthened in proportion to the TSE-listed
company share of equity in foreign subsidiaries.

3.2.2. Entry
The variable of interest in hypotheses 2 and 4 is location attrac
tiveness, a binary variable. The dataset is expanded so that, for each
investment, both the chosen location (Entry = 1) and counterfactual
locations (Entry = 0) comprise the full choice set.

Hypothesis 4. The positive relationship between host-country SHR and
JFDI attractiveness is strengthened in proportion to the TSE-listed company
share of equity in foreign subsidiaries.

3.3. Independent variables

3. Method

3.3.1. Shareholder rights protection (SHR)
Our measure of SHR is the index constructed by Guillén and Capron
(2016), which covers 78 least-developed, emerging, and developed
countries between 1970 and 2016. Unlike previous measures of minority
shareholder rights protection, such as La Porta et al. (1998) and Lele and
Siems (2007), Guillen and Capron’s longitudinal index spans more years
and countries. As such, it tracks considerable changes in minority
shareholder rights over the past 40 years, overcoming the limitations of
cross-sectional measures (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008;
La Porta et al., 1998).
Guillen and Capron’s measure comprises ten legal provisions for
protecting minority shareholder rights, identified to be the most rele
vant by legal scholars (Lele & Siems, 2007; Siems, 2008). It includes
powers of general meeting for de facto changes, agenda-setting power,
anticipation of shareholder decision facilitation, prohibition of multiple
voting rights, independent board members, feasibility of directors’
dismissal, private enforcement of directors’ duties (derivative suit),
shareholder action against resolutions of the general meeting, manda
tory bid, and disclosure of major share ownership (Guillén & Capron,
2016). 52 coders, each holding a J.D. from their home country, and are
experts in the corporate legislation, participated in the data collection.
This measure covers countries accounting for about 95 percent of the
total world GDP, in 2011.

3.1. Sample
Our data are drawn from the Kaigai Shinsutsu Kigyou Souran (Japa
nese Overseas Investment), an annual survey compiled by Toyo Keizei
(TK database). We use the 2014 edition, which provides a nearpopulation of Japanese foreign investments made up to that year. To
capture the significant rise in Japanese investment precipitating from
the US Plaza Accord in 1985, we focus on the period 1986–2013
(Yamawaki, 2007). During this period, a total of 37,895 subsidiaries
were established in 144 countries. We eliminated small-island devel
oping nations which are typically considered ‘flags of convenience’
rather than locations for FDI that involves significant economic activity.
This reduced our sample to 25,953 subsidiaries in 108 countries. Ac
counting for missing data, our final dataset was an unbalanced panel of
25,518 subsidiaries established over a 28-year period, selecting from
amongst 34–64 alternative countries for investment 1. The sample for
the governance model contains fewer countries, and consequently a
smaller sample of 23,616 subsidiaries, owing to missing data at the time
of observation, rather than the time of subsidiary establishment 2. Our
final samples of subsidiaries were thus fairly representative of all Jap
anese FDI. The number of countries is more important for the location
choice analysis we conduct, but our method is robust to both the pres
ence or absence of unchosen alternatives.
The TK database provides several important characteristics of JFDI
that cannot be determined from aggregate country-level FDI. First, each
investment is individually observed according to its year and month of
establishment, its location (i.e. country) of establishment, and the
identity of its parent firms. The latter is important for disaggregating the
effect of agglomeration (i.e. FDI stocks) as attractors of new investment
from the impact of SHR. The country and year of establishment allow us

3.3.2. Listed parent ownership
Our measure of listed ownership is calculated from the individual
ownership shares of Japanese parents recorded in the TK database. We
aggregated each fraction of ownership held by Japanese parents listed
on the TSE. The remaining share is held by unlisted Japanese and nonJapanese (typically local) firms.
3.4. Controls
Our model for testing hypotheses 1 and 3 included several control
variables to account for alternate effects on the Japanese expatriate
ratio. We use GDP per capita, as more developed countries are more
attractive for expatriates, and hiring local managers may not result in
significant cost savings (Gong, 2003). Geographic, psychic and political
distances impact both the costs of managing FDI, and the desirability of
an expatriate assignment (Rickley & Karim, 2018). To account for these
factors, we use the distance between the capital of the host country and
Tokyo (Dow & Karunaratna, 2006). The psychic distance index, a
formative factor comprising linguistic, religious, industrial develop
ment, educational and political distances of the host country from Japan

1

Countries include: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Ghana, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Korea, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macau, Malaysia, Mexico,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, USA, Venezuela, Vietnam.
2
Governance model does not contain subsidiaries from: Georgia, Ghana,
Lebanon, Macao, Nepal, and New Zealand.
225

N.C. Lupton et al.

Journal of Business Research 151 (2022) 222–231

(Dow & Karunaratna, 2006) using the Mahalanobis distances procedure
recommended by Berry, Guillén, and Zhou (2010), and the political
constraints index of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008) account for
cultural and other institutional distances, respectively. Japanese parent
firm’s international experience, measured in aggregate subsidiary-years,
is included to account for its association with the declining use of ex
patriates (Riaz, Rowe, & Beamish, 2014). We also include two dummy
variables indicating whether the subsidiary was a joint venture, or an
acquisition, respectively.
In our second model, we included controls to account for other
known attractors of FDI. From the World Trade Organization, we
included per capita GDP and GDP growth to account for overall market
attractiveness and economic health of alternate investment locations
(Caves, 2007), trade as a percentage of GDP, FDI as a percentage of GDP
(Dunning, 1988) and political constraints which mitigate public expro
priation risk in a host country (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Henisz,
2000). We supplement GDP per capita with unemployment levels, as we
were unable to source a direct measure of labor costs with sufficient
coverage for our sample. We included inflation rate, measured by
changes in the consumer price index, and exchange rates which can
impact the timing of investment (Deseatnicov & Akiba, 2016; Takagi &
Shi, 2011) from the World Bank. Similar to our governance model, we
control for psychic and geographic distances. Finally, we include the
logarithmic count of prior entries to a country by Japanese parent firms
to account for agglomeration (Tan & Meyer, 2011).

decomposed into an independent, identically distributed error term and
a random component, allowing us to model both fixed effects of location
characteristics, such as SHR, and variance in the utility of those char
acteristics. In the context of our hypotheses, the impact of shareholder
rights index on location attractiveness is allowed to vary from one in
vestment decision to the next, thus avoiding the restrictive assumption
of preference homogeneity (Train, 2009). The probability of selecting a
country (a) for an investment (i) is integrated over the density function,
f(β):
∫
Pia = Pia (β)f (β)dβ
(2)
where the logistic probabilities are given as:
exia βi +wia α
Pia (β) = ∑A
xia βi +wia α
a=1 e
βi are random coefficients that vary by subsidiary, and xia is a vector
of alternative specific variables (i.e. SHR index, interaction of SHR index
and listed Japanese parent ownership, and controls). α is a vector of
fixed coefficients for wia which is a vector of country-specific control
variables. Discrete choice modelling does not rely on the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption (Revelt & Train, 1998; Train,
2009). Hence, there is no assumption of independence of the preference
for a location from counterfactuals in the choice set. The integral in (2)
has no closed-form solution, and thus is approximated by maximum
simulated likelihood using 500 Halton draws, which is sufficient to
produce consistent estimators (Hole, 2007).

3.5. Analysis
We use two independent models to test our hypotheses, accounting
for our two dependent variables. Hypotheses 1 and 3 were tested using
mixed-effects fractional regression. Hypotheses 2 and 4 were tested with
discrete choice modelling.

4. Results
4.1. Shareholder rights protection (SHR) and Japanese expatriate staffing
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and pairwise cor
relations (two-tailed) for all variables included in the mixed-effect
fractional regression model, used to test hypotheses 1 and 3. The
average subsidiary had a ratio of 10% expatriates to total employees,
and 47% ownership by parent firms listed on the TSE. 55% of these
subsidiaries were joint ventures, while<1% were acquisitions. High
correlations are observed between some of the country control variables,
such as between GDP per capita, geographic and psychic distances. SHR
also has moderate correlation with GDP per capita (0.331), which can be
explained by the fact that more developed economies tend to have more
developed capital markets.
Table 2 presents the results of the heteroskedastic probit model used
to estimate the impact of SHR on Japanese expatriates deployed as a
percentage of total subsidiary employees. Model 1 includes all control
variables, and the Wald chi2 coefficient of 3,854.05 (p < 0.001) leads to
rejecting the hypothesis that all coefficients of these predictors are
simultaneously zero. Model 2 adds SHR protection, while Model 3 adds
the interaction between SHR protection and listed Japanese ownership
ratio. Individual variance inflation factors were between 1.01 and 3.57,
with the mean value being 1.80 for the full model. The variance inflation
factors for GDP per capita and geographic distance were 3.57 and 3.03,
respectively, and their correlations with other country control variables
are high. Thus, caution in interpreting their respective coefficients is
warranted.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that Japanese expatriate ratio would decline
as SHR in the host country of an investment increased. The coefficient (β
¼ -0.044, p < 0.001) in Model 2 indicates that a 10% increase in SHR
results in a reduction in expatriate deployment of 4.4%, supporting H1.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the negative relationship between SHR and
expatriate ratio would be strengthened for subsidiaries with a higher
share of ownership by Japanese parents listed on the TSE. Again, the
coefficient of the interaction between SHR and listed ownership (β ¼
-0.011, p < 0.05) is in keeping with this prediction, and indicates that a

3.5.1. Mixed-effects fractional regression model
Our dependent variable for testing hypotheses 1 and 3 is the Japa
nese expatriate ratio, taking on values from zero to one, inclusive. These
constraints on the value of the dependent variable violate the assump
tions of ordinary least square, logistic and beta regression models (Wulff
& Villadsen, 2020). Our data consists of repeated observations of sub
sidiaries, so lack of independence also had to be accounted for. We thus
modelled the relationship between expatriate ratio and the predictors
using a heteroskedastic probit model, with expatriate ratio following a
binomial distribution. This approximation to a linear relationship for a
fractional dependent variable is shown to produce consistent estimates,
including near extreme values of the dependent variable (Papke &
Wooldridge, 1996; 2008). Hence, we estimated the following mixed
effects equation, fitted via maximum likelihood:
Pr(yit ∕
= 0|xit ) = Φ(Xit β + vi )

(1)

with variance components:
xit β + vi + ∊it
This model predicts the dependent variable, expatriate ratio (y)
given a vector of controls, SHR index, listed ownership and the inter
action of the two (X) for i panels (subsidiaries) and t years, and Φ is the
standard normal cumulative distribution function. ∊it are iid Gaussian
distributed, with mean zero and variance of 1, independently of the
subsidiary random effects, vi . This method produces average partial ef
fects which are identified without assumptions about serial correlation
between repeated observations (Papke & Wooldridge, 2008).
3.5.2. Discrete choice modelling
Discrete choice modelling is a simulated log-pseudolikelihood
method for modelling choices between realistic alternatives, rather
than an infinite set of theoretical alternatives (Revelt & Train, 1998). We
use a mixed logit model of discrete choice, in which unobserved utility is
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations (Expatriate Staffing Sample).
Variable

Mean

s.d.

1. Expatriate ratio
2. GDP per capita (10,000 s)
3. Geographic distance (1,000 s)
4. Psychic distance
5. Political stability
6. Int’l experience
7. Joint venture
8. Acquisition
9. Listed ownership
10. SHR index

0.099
1.871
5.942
0.734
0.439
3.216
0.549
0.004
0.472
5.822

0.136
1.839
3.710
0.328
0.378
0.644
0.498
0.060
0.437
1.355

1

−
−
−
−

0.282*
0.226*
0.222*
0.157*
0.118*
0.282*
0.024*
0.182*
0.066*

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0.747*
− 0.647*
0.650*
0.059*
− 0.214*
0.064*
0.086*
0.331*

− 0.542*
0.758*
0.082*
− 0.118*
0.052*
0.035*
0.062*

− 0.662*
− 0.015*
0.117*
− 0.042*
− 0.079*
− 0.085*

0.071*
− 0.069*
0.047*
0.027*
0.072*

0.085*
0.014*
0.089*
0.074*

− 0.010*
− 0.497*
− 0.159*

0.003
0.024*

0.061*

Notes: n = 182,169; countries = 55; subsidiaries = 23,616; and * denotes significance at 5%.
Table 2
Shareholder Rights Protection, Equity Ownership Level and Expatriate Deploy
ment Ratio.
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

GDP pc (10,000 s)

− 0.013 (0.004)
***
0.035 (0.002)
***
− 0.371 (0.018)
***
− 0.155 (0.015)
***
− 0.213 (0.005)
***

0.006 (0.004)

0.006 (0.004)

0.030 (0.002)
***
− 0.345 (0.018)
***
− 0.165 (0.015)
***
− 0.193 (0.005)
***

0.030 (0.002)
***
− 0.345 (0.018)
***
− 0.165 (0.015)
***
− 0.194 (0.005)
***

− 0.095 (0.008)
***
− 0.314 (0.038)
***
0.101 (0.010)
***
..
..

− 0.106 (0.008)
***
− 0.309 (0.039)
***
0.095 (0.010)
***
− 0.044 (0.003)
***
..

− 1.290 (0.005)
***
3,854.05
(0.000)***
182,169
23,616
1–24
7.7
55

− 1.288 (0.005)
***
4,072.58
(0.000)***
182,169
23,616
1–24
7.7
55

− 0.106 (0.008)
***
− 0.309 (0.039)
***
0.095 (0.010)
***
− 0.043 (0.003)
***
− 0.011 (0.005)
*
− 1.288 (0.005)
***
4,072.96
(0.000)***
182,169
23,616
1–24
7.7
55

Geographic distance
(1,000 s)
Psychic distance
Political stability
Parent int’l experience
Entry mode:
Joint venture
Acquisition
Listed ownership
SHR index
Listed ownership × SHR
index
Constant
Wald chi2
Number of observations
Number of subsidiaries
Years (min – max)
Year (average)
Number of countries

Fig. 2. SHR index and Japanese expatriate deployment ratio for subsidiaries
with low vs. high listed Japanese parent firm ownership (hypothesis 3).

and Japanese expatriate ratio (Hypothesis 1) and the moderating impact
of listed ownership, which strengthens the aforementioned relationship
(Hypothesis 3). However, as noted below, robustness checks found that
the coefficient for the interaction of SHR and listed ownership share is
not significant across different time periods, and thus a more conser
vative interpretation is that Hypothesis 3 received qualified support.
4.2. Shareholder rights protection (SHR) and location attractiveness
Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations and pairwise cor
relations (two-tailed) for all variables included in mixed-effects discrete
choice model, and Table 4 presents the results. Standard deviations of
estimates modelled as random are shown in Table 4 in italics, immedi
ately following the mean of the coefficient estimate. We do not include
the mean and standard deviation for location choice because it sum
marizes both the actual subsidiary location and a wide range of coun
terfactual locations. The average location considered for investment has
a GDP per capita of about $17,000, 3.9% GDP growth, and FDI and trade
accounted for roughly 43% and 72% of GDP, respectively, though
integration within the global economy varied widely amongst countries
included in the sample. Similar to the governance models, the highest
correlations occurred between country control variables, especially GDP
per capita, GDP growth, geographic and psychic distances.
Model 1 includes all control variables, but excludes the SHR index.
Model 2 includes the effect of shareholder rights, while Model 3 adds the
interaction between SHR protection and ownership percentage by listed
Japanese parent firms. The individual variance inflation factors for the
discrete choice models were all below 3, with the highest average
(Model 3) being 1.82. The coefficients can be interpreted according to
the formula 100 × Φ (-bk / sk) where bk and sk are the mean and standard
deviation of the kth coefficient and Φ is the standard normal cumulative

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; all tests are two-tailed; *, **,
and *** denote significance levels of 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively. Model 3
individual VIF <= 3.57, mean VIF = 1.80.

10% increase in listed ownership share results in a reduction in the ratio
of expatriate to total employees of 1.1%. Fig. 2 plots the effect of the
interaction between SHR and Japanese expatriate ratio for two levels of
listed ownership (one standard deviation below and above the mean,
respectively). Control variables are held at their means to generate these
plots.
Fig. 2 shows that the relationship between SHR and Japanese
expatriate ratios for both values of listed ownership is negative, but that
the slope is steeper for high listed ownership than for low listed
ownership, thus providing additional evidence in support of H3. Note
that the marginal predicted probabilities are a non-linear function of the
covariates in the generalized estimating equation, as the marginal pre
dicted value is not only a function of these covariates, but also the
starting value of the predictor variable, in this case SHR. However, the
plot depicted in Fig. 2 suggests very little curvature, such that a linear
interpretation is practically sufficient. In summary, the results of models
2 and 3 support the hypothesized relationships between SHR protection
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations (Subsidiary Location Choice Sample).
Variable

Mean

s.d.

1

2

1. Location
2. GDP pc (10,000 s)
3. GDP growth
4. Log exchange rate
5. Inflation
6. Unemployment
7. FDI stock
8. Trade ratio
9. Geog. distance (1000 s)
10. Psychic distance
11. Prior entries
12. Political stability
13. SHR index
14. Listed ownership

–
1.711
3.885
2.580
7.194
33.126
42.843
72.761
9.181
0.763
0.142
0.337
4.696
0.572

–
1.936
3.472
2.916
4.972
291.923
200.573
54.823
3.896
0.298
0.526
0.201
1.653
0.415

− 0.012*
0.104*
0.003*
− 0.070*
− 0.012*
− 0.009*
0.014*
− 0.123*
− 0.001
0.148*
− 0.073*
0.056*
− 0.000

− 0.179*
0.157*
− 0.129*
− 0.066*
0.108*
0.176*
0.022*
− 0.599*
0.049*
0.315*
0.152*
− 0.006*

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0.113*
0.303*
0.120*
0.028*
0.098*
− 0.314*
0.111*
0.073*
− 0.251*
0.024*
0.011*

0.055*
0.201*
0.074*
0.011*
0.249*
− 0.050*
0.035*
0.025*
0.150*
− 0.015*

− 0.003*
− 0.018*
− 0.107*
0.352*
0.041*
− 0.065*
0.120*
0.155*
− 0.005*

− 0.018*
− 0.070*
0.132*
0.041*
− 0.010*
− 0.009*
− 0.016*
− 0.010*

0.084*
0.052*
− 0.120*
0.002*
− 0.019*
0.125*
0.018*

− 0.225*
− 0.054*
0.038*
− 0.120*
0.154*
0.013*

0.049*
− 0.084*
0.258*
− 0.028*
− 0.000

−
−
−
−

Variable

10

11

12

13

11.
12.
13.
14.

− 0.090*
− 0.382*
− 0.178*
0.017*

− 0.025*
0.103*
0.048*

− 0.042*
0.001

0.039*

Prior entries
Political stability
Shareholder rights
Listed ownership

Notes: n = 1,363,990; countries = 64; subsidiaries = 25,518; and * denotes significance at 5%. Mean and standard deviation of ‘Location’ depends on the choice set
used in the analysis and hence are omitted from the descriptive statistics.

our data spans a significant period of time, we used subsample testing to
investigate possible differences over time. We used the Asian financial
crisis and 2008 financial crisis to define the subsamples, observing a
small drop in the number of investments made in 1997–98 and in
2007–08. In the case of expatriate deployment, H1 continues to receive
strong support across all subsamples. The coefficient for the interaction
of SHR and listed ownership share (H3) was not significant in two of the
subsamples (1998–2007 and 2008–2013). While this can be accounted
for by the smaller sample sizes, caution should be used in interpreting
this effect, as it may be small. For location choice, the results for both the
main effect of SHR (H2) and its interaction with listed ownership share
(H4) received consistent support across all time periods. The results of
these robustness checks are available from the authors, upon request.

distribution (Hole, 2007). The coefficients in Model 2 indicate that in
80.1% of subsidiary location choices, MNEs preferred locations with
higher SHR, and also that MNEs prefer locations with higher GDP per
capita, GDP growth, exchange rates, psychic distance, and a larger
number of prior entries by Japanese firms. In contrast, MNEs prefer
locations with lower inflation, unemployment, geographic distance, and
political stability.
The coefficients for FDI stock, trade ratio, and inflation are quite
small, and so their signs should not be interpreted without consideration
of the diminished effect size. Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive rela
tionship between SHR protection and the probability that Japanese
MNEs will choose a location to make an investment. In Model 2, the
positive coefficient (β ¼ 0.242, p < 0.001) associated with SHR pro
tection supports Hypothesis 2.
Model 3 adds the interaction of SHR and ownership share of listed
Japanese parent firms and the size of the coefficient for SHR declines (β
¼ 0.172). For listed firms, the preference for higher SHR protection was
incrementally higher (β ¼ 0.132) compared to unlisted firms, but the
overall effect must consider the magnitude of the main effect of SHR
protection. Therefore, we use a user-defined Stata function (Hole, 2007)
to compute the predicted probabilities of locating a subsidiary in a
specific country, at varying levels of SHR protection and listed owner
ship share, while holding all other covariates at their sample means.
Fig. 3 plots the interaction between SHR and the predicted probability of
establishing a subsidiary, where low and high listed ownership are one
standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively. As depicted
in Fig. 3, the relationship between SHR and FDI location attractiveness is
positive for both values of listed ownership, but the slope is steeper for
high listed ownership than for low listed ownership, consistent with H4.

5. Discussion
5.1. Contributions to theory
We found that SHR attracts FDI due to its mimetic and normative
influences, rather than the coercive pressures normally associated with
state policy (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). We thus extend research on
institutional distance (Kostova et al., 2020) by examining how SHR
protection can influence MNEs via informal (mimetic and normative) vs.
formal (coercive) pressures (Scott, 2008). Research on the unintentional
consequences of policy distance has led to other counterintuitive find
ings, such as positive association between institutional distance and the
quality of the HQ-subsidiary relationships (Li, Jiang, & Shen, 2016).
Research on unintended effects is less prevalent than on the intended
effects of institutional reform (Cuervo-Cazurra, Gaur, & Singh, 2019).
We thus contribute to research on the interaction between the institu
tional fields of MNE home and host countries (Saka-Helmhout et al.,
2016). Moreover, our paper extends previous studies on MNEs’ FDI
decision making. Using UK firms’ investment within continental Europe,
Lskavyan and Spatareanu (2011) found that weak shareholder protec
tion in the host countries is less attractive to FDI, but also argued that it
could be influenced by parent firms’ ownership concentration. Our
paper reaffirms the relationship between high SHR and the location
attractiveness based on more host country locations. Furthermore, it
illustrates that exchange-listed MNE ownership strengthen the attrac
tiveness of high SHR countries.
We also contribute to distinguishing public from private expropriation
risk in international business decisions (Sartor & Beamish, 2019).

4.3. Robustness tests
We modelled effects as random when they resulted in significant
preference heterogeneity, and modeled all others as fixed. We also ran
our models using only fixed effects, finding similar support for our hy
potheses, with a much larger observed estimate for the effect of SHR on
FDI location attractiveness. Hence, the result of this study is more con
servative than would be obtained using a purely fixed effects model. We
also conducted tests of subsamples and with the inclusion of dummy
variables to account for different sectors (i.e. primary, manufacturing,
retail, wholesale, and services), finding only differences that could be
explained by the resulting change in the sample size and power. Since
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Substantial research examines the role of subsidiary managers as agents
of the MNE headquarters (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Meyer et al.,
2020), with many results indicating that expatriates are preferred. Our
results demonstrate that MNEs will deploy fewer expatriates when SHR
protection is higher and a positive relationship between SHR protection
and location attractiveness for FDI, despite the fact that Japanese MNEs
have less propensity to employ local managers than other MNEs
(Beamish & Inkpen, 1998). Our argument was based on the normative
and cognitive pressures arising from the education and experience of
local employees, respectively, which create conformance to manage
ment practices of higher SHR countries. Nonetheless, our findings
should be extended with multilevel examinations incorporating specific
qualities of expatriates, such as cultural intelligence (Meyer et al., 2020),
in order to understand how MNE staffing inclinations align with sub
sidiary performance.
Finally, our empirical findings extend the generalizability of the
relationship between SHR and FDI attractiveness by examining discrete
investment decisions rather than the aggregate value of FDI flows
(Baulkaran & Lupton, 2020; Wang et al., 2012). Our study uses a direct
measure of SHR protection (Guillén & Capron, 2016), which is both
conceptually and empirically separate from property rights protection,
and the legal systems that produced them. While on the surface our
finding appears to contradict that of Wang et al. (2012), who find that an
increase in shareholder rights protection in the US could partially
explain a reduced inflow of Japanese FDI, our sample provides a range of
host country choices. To date, the SHR attractiveness relationship has
been confirmed for MNEs from Europe (Lskavyan & Spatareanu, 2011),
United States (Baulkaran & Lupton, 2020; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003)
and we extend this to FDI from Japan. This represents the triad of major
investing regions of the world, but FDI from emerging economies is
surging (Cieślik & Tran, 2019; Cui & Jiang, 2009), thus increasing the
diversity of home country institutional environments that need to be
considered. When considering institutional distance, direction matters
(Konara & Shirodkar, 2018), and so future research should consider FDI
from countries that place lower priority on SHR.

Table 4
Japanese FDI Location Choice and the Effect of Host Country Shareholder Rights
Protection.
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

GDP pc (10,000 s)

0.099 (0.005)
***
0.058 (0.003)
***
0.066 (0.005)
***
− 0.024
(0.004)***
− 0.002
(0.000)***
− 0.002
(0.000)***
− 0.001
(0.001)***
0.006 (0.000)
***
− 0.282
(0.008)***
0.200 (0.007)
***
0.429 (0.034)
***
2.243 (0.137)
***
1.563 (0.172)
***
0.271 (0.060)
***
..

..

0.076 (0.006)
***
0.052 (0.003)
***
0.061 (0.005)
***
− 0.046 (0.004)
***
− 0.001 (0.000)
***
− 0.001 (0.000)
***
− 0.002 (0.000)
***
0.004 (0.000)
***
− 0.272 (0.007)
***
0.189 (0.007)
***
0.669 (0.036)
***
2.100 (0.126)
***
1.432 (0.161)
***
0.322 (0.053)
***
0.242 (0.009)
***
0.302 (0.021)
***
..

− 75,419.546

− 74,679.478

0.076 (0.006)
***
0.052 (0.003)
***
0.061 (0.005)
***
− 0.047
(0.004)***
− 0.001
(0.000) ***
− 0.001
(0.000)***
− 0.001
(0.000)***
0.004 (0.000)
***
− 0.272
(0.007)***
0.189 (0.007)
***
0.673 (0.036)
***
2.095 (0.126)
***
1.424 (0.160)
***
0.328 (0.054)
***
0.172 (0.013)
***
0.177 (0.044)
***
0.132 (0.015)
***
0.378 (0.030)
***
− 74,613.357

1,363,990
34–64
(53.452)
5,673
25,518

1,363,990
34–64 (53.452)

GDP growth
Log exchange rate
Inflation
Unemployment
FDI stock
Trade ratio (mean)
Standard deviation of
coefficient
Geog. distance (1,000 s,
mean of coefficient)
Standard deviation of
coefficient
Psychic distance
Prior entries (mean of
coefficient)
Standard deviation of
coefficient
Political stability (mean of
coefficient)
SHR index (mean of
coefficient)
Standard deviation of
coefficient
SHR × Listed ownership
Standard deviation of
coefficient
Log simulatedpseudolikelihood
Number of observations
Number of countries (mean)
Number of parent firms
Number of subsidiaries

..

5,673
25,518

1,363,990
34–64
(53.452)
5,673
25,518

5.2. Implications for policy and practice
Our findings have implications for policy makers trying to avoid
FDI’s negative influence on home country employment, referred to as
‘brain drain’ or ‘hollowing out’ effects (Blomstrom, Fors, & Lipsey,
1997; Huijie, 2018; Lipsey, 1995). While not as frequently discussed,
expatriate staffing can also represent a form of industrial hollowing out,
with the consequence that less managerial experience is accumulated
within the local population. Policy makers can help to mitigate this ef
fect by instituting stronger legal frameworks for SHR protection, thereby
encouraging the MNE to hire locally.
Our finding that Japanese MNEs choose higher SHR countries for
investment also has implications for managers making FDI decisions.
While expatriate staffing can lead to superior subsidiary financial per
formance where increasing subsidiary knowledge creation capability is
desirable (Kawai & Chung, 2019), on average, employing local man
agers is less costly than deploying expatriates, and the anticipated costs
of monitoring will also be reduced when SHR protections are high. Our
findings suggest that MNEs invest in host countries when SHR is
congruent with home country institutions. This not only helps investing
countries alleviate their ‘brain drain’ concern, but can also save the MNE
the substantial costs of deploying expatriates.

Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by Japanese parent firm; *,
**, and *** denote significance levels of 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively; Model
3 individual VIF <= 1.82, mean VIF = 1.32.

5.3. Limitations and future research
Our study focuses only on the outward FDI of Japanese MNEs, and
thus only one direction of institutional distance (Berry et al., 2010;
Zaheer et al., 2012). Future studies should examine the impact of SHR
protection on FDI decisions made by MNEs from low SHR protection
countries, as these may be unaffected or repelled by high SHR

Fig. 3. SHR index and location attractiveness for subsidiaries with low vs. high
listed Japanese parent firm ownership (hypothesis 4).
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protection. Future research should also continue to examine specific
institutional factors, especially in cases where institutional logics may be
contradictory, as in the emerging policy implementation of the United
Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. Also, research on subsidiary
shareholder-stakeholder conflicts warrants future examination as it is
outside the scope of this study.
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6. Conclusions
We found that SHR protection is an attractive to FDI of Japanese
MNEs, especially those listed on the TSE. Congruent with organizational
institutionalism, we reasoned that it is more efficient for MNEs from
home countries with strong SHR protection to locate in countries with
similar environments, not because they offer legal protection to share
holders in the home country, but because the socialization of local
managers and employees reduces private expropriation risk. In arguing
that informal institutional pressures are the mechanism at play, we
demonstrate the value of investigating the unintentional impact of
regulatory changes. Specifically, stronger SHR protection is more likely
to attract FDI, other things equal, and those investments will involve a
smaller number of expatriates, thus creating more opportunities for
devleoping local management talent. This latter finding also provides
potential benefits for MNEs to mitigate the expenses and risk associated
with expatriate deployment.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Nathaniel C. Lupton: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original
draft, Visualization, Validation, Software, Project administration,
Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptu
alization. Vishaal Baulkaran: Writing – review & editing, Writing –
original draft. Yeonji No: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original
draft.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
References
Andersson, U., & Forsgren, M. (1996). Subsidiary embeddedness and control in the
multinational corporation. International Business Review, 5(5), 487–508.
Banerjee, S., & Venaik, S. (2018). The effect of corporate political activity on MNC
subsidiary legitimacy: An institutional perspective. Management International Review,
58(5), 813–844.
Barnard, H., & Luiz, J. M. (2018). Escape FDI and the dynamics of a cumulative process
of institutional misalignment and contestation: Stress, strain and failure. Journal of
World Business, 53(5), 605–619.
Baulkaran, V., & Lupton, N. C. (2020). U.S. FDI and shareholder rights protection in
developed and developing economies. Multinational Finance Journal, 24(3/4),
155–182.
Beamish, P. W., & Inkpen, A. C. (1998). Japanese firms and the decline of the Japanese
expatriate. Journal of World Business, 33(1), 35–50.
Beddewela, E. (2019). Managing corporate community responsibility in multinational
corporations: Resolving institutional duality. Long Range Planning, 52(6), 1–19.
Berry, H., Guillén, M. F., & Zhou, N. (2010). An institutional approach to cross-national
distance. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(9), 1460–1480.
Björkman, I., Fey, C. F., & Park, H. J. (2007). Institutional theory and MNC subsidiary
hrm practices: Evidence from a three-country study. Journal of International Business
Studies, 38(3), 430–446.
Blomstrom, M., Fors, G., & Lipsey, R. E. (1997). Foreign direct investment and
employment: Home country experience in the united states and Sweden. Economic
Journal, 107(445), 1787–1797.
Brock, D. M., Shenkar, O., Shoham, A., & Siscovick, I. C. (2008). National culture and
expatriate deployment. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(8), 1293–1309.
Buckley, P. J. (2009). Internalisation thinking: From the multinational enterprise to the
global factory. International Business Review, 18(3), 224–235.
Caves, R. E. (2007). Multinational enterprise and economic analysis (3rd edition).
Cambridge University Press.
Chapman, E. F., Sisk, F. A., Schatten, J., & Miles, E. W. (2018). Human resource
development and human resource management levers for sustained competitive

230

N.C. Lupton et al.

Journal of Business Research 151 (2022) 222–231
Shin, D., Hasse, V. C., & Schotter, A. P. J. (2017). Multinational enterprises within
cultural space and place: Integrating cultural distance and tightness-looseness.
Academy of Management Journal, 60(3), 904–921.
Siems, M. M. (2008). Shareholder protection around the world (leximetric II). Delaware
Journal of Corporate Law, 33, 111–147.
Slangen, A. H. L., & Beugelsdijk, S. (2010). The impact of institutional hazards on foreign
multinational activity: A contingency perspective. Journal of International Business
Studies, 41(6), 980–995.
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1965). Organizations and social structure. In J. G. March (Ed.),
Handbook of organizations. Rand-McNally.
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. The
Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571–610.
Suutari, V., & Tornikoski, C. (2001). The challenge of expatriate compensation: The
sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction among expatriates. International Journal of
Human Resource Management, 12(3), 389–404.
Takagi, S., & Shi, Z. (2011). Exchange rate movements and foreign direct investment
(FDI): Japanese investment in Asia, 1987–2008. Japan and the World Economy, 23(4),
265–272.
Tan, D. C., & Meyer, K. E. (2011). Country-of-origin and industry FDI agglomeration of
foreign investors in an emerging economy. Journal of International Business Studies,
42(4), 504–520.
Train, K. E. (2009). Discrete choice methods with simulation (2nd edition). Cambridge
University Press.
Trapczynski, P., & Banalieva, E. R. (2016). Institutional difference, organizational
experience, and foreign affiliate performance: Evidence from Polish firms. Journal of
World Business, 51(5), 826–842.
Wang, P. M., Alba, J. D., & Park, D. (2012). Corporate governance and FDI: Firm-level
evidence from Japanese FDI into the US. International Review of Economics & Finance,
24, 43–50.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational
contracting. Free Press.
Wulff, J. N., & Villadsen, A. R. (2020). Keeping it within bounds: Regression analysis of
proportions in international business. Journal of International Business Studies, 51(2),
244–262.
Yamawaki, H. (2007). Japanese exports and foreign direct investment: Imperfect competition
in international markets. Cambridge University Press.
Yi, J., Meng, S., Macaulay, C. D., & Peng, M. W. (2019). Corruption and foreign direct
investment phases: The moderating role of institutions. Journal of International
Business Policy, 2(2), 167–181.
Zaheer, S., Nachum, L., & Schomaker, M. S. (2012). Distance without direction: Restoring
credibility to a much-loved construct. Journal of International Business Studies, 43(1),
18–27.

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance.
The Journal of political economy, 106(6), 1113–1155.
Lele, P., & Siems, P. (2007). Shareholder protection: A leximetric approach. JournaL of
Corporate Law Studies, 7(17), 17–50.
Li, J., Jiang, F., & Shen, J. (2016). Institutional distance and the quality of the
headquarters–subsidiary relationship: The moderating role of the institutionalization
of headquarters’ practices in subsidiaries. International Business Review, 25(2),
589–603.
Lien, Y. C., & Filatotchev, I. (2015). Ownership characteristics as determinants of FDI
location decisions in emerging economies. Journal of World Business, 50(4), 637–650.
Lien, Y. C., Piesse, J., Strange, R., & Filatotchev, I. (2005). The role of corporate
governance in FDI decisions: Evidence from Taiwan. International Business Review, 14
(6), 739–763.
Lipsey, R. E. (1995). Outward direct investment and the US economy (pp. 7–41). University
of Chicago Press/NBER: The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations.
Chicago.
Lskavyan, V., & Spatareanu, M. (2011). Shareholder protection, ownership concentration
and FDI. Journal of Economics and Business, 63(1), 69–85.
Martínez-Ferrero, J., & García-Sánchez, I.-M. (2017). Coercive, normative and mimetic
isomorphism as determinants of the voluntary assurance of sustainability reports.
International Business Review, 26(1), 102–118.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal-structure as
myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363.
Meyer, K. E., Li, C., & Schotter, A. P. J. (2020). Managing the MNE subsidiary: Advancing
a multi-level and dynamic research agenda. Journal of International Business Studies,
51(4), 538–576.
Minbaeva, D., Pedersen, T., Björkman, I., Fey, C. F., & Park, H. J. (2003). MNC
knowledge transfer, subsidiary absorptive capacity, and HRM. Journal of
International Business Studies, 34(6), 586–599.
Mingo, S., Junkunc, M., & Morales, F. (2018). The interplay between home and host
country institutions in an emerging market context: Private equity in Latin America.
Journal of World Business, 53(5), 653–667.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge
University Press.
Oehmichen, J., & Puck, J. (2016). Embeddedness, ownership mode and dynamics, and
the performance of MNE subsidiaries. Journal of International Management, 22(1),
17–28.
Papke, L. E., & Wooldridge, J. M. (1996). Econometric methods for fractional response
variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates. Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 11(6), 619–632.
Papke, L. E., & Wooldridge, J. M. (2008). Panel data methods for fractional response
variables with an application to test pass rates. Journal of Econometrics, 145(1),
121–133.
Peng, G. Z. (2012). Fdi legitimacy and MNC subsidiary control: From legitimation to
competition. Journal of International Management, 18(2), 115–131.
Popli, M., Raithatha, M., & Fuad, M. (2021). Impact of institutional imprinting on the
persistence of superior profits: A study of regulatory punctuation in India. Journal of
Business Research, 124, 223–235.
Rabbiosi, L., & Santangelo, G. D. (2019). Host country corruption and the organization of
HQ–subsidiary relationships. Journal of International Business Studies, 50(1),
111–124.
Revelt, D., & Train, K. (1998). Mixed logit with repeated choices: Households’ choices of
appliance efficiency level. Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(4), 647–657.
Riaz, S., Rowe, W. G., & Beamish, P. W. (2014). Expatriate-deployment levels and
subsidiary growth: A temporal analysis. Journal of World Business, 49(1), 1–11.
Rickley, M., & Karim, S. (2018). Managing institutional distance: Examining how firmspecific advantages impact foreign subsidiary CEO staffing. Journal of World Business,
53(5), 740–751.
Roth, K., & O’Donnell, S. (1996). Foreign subsidiary compensation strategy: An agency
theory perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 39(3), 678–703.
Saka-Helmhout, A., Deeg, R., & Greenwood, R. (2016). The MNE as a challenge to
institutional theory: Key concepts, recent developments and empirical evidence.
Journal of Management Studies, 53(1), 1–11.
Sartor, M. A., & Beamish, P. W. (2019). Private sector corruption, public sector
corruption and the organizational structure of foreign subsidiaries. Journal of
Business Ethics, 167(4), 725–744.
Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and organizations. Sage. Publications.

Nathaniel C. Lupton (PhD, Western University) is an Assistant Professor at the Lucas
College of Business at San Jose State University. His research interests include de
terminants of foreign direct investment strategy and performance, international risk
mitigation, international knowledge diffusion, international research networks, and
management in developing economies. His ongoing research examines the determinants of
national and international inequality, international infrastructure projects, and institu
tional arbitrage. His research has appeared in journals such as Academy of Management
Perspectives, Business and Society, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Knowledge Man
agement, Journal of World Business, and others.
Vishaal Baulkaran (CFA, PhD Wilfrid Laurier University) is an Associate Professor of
Finance and Finance Area Chair at the Dhillon School of Business. His research interests
include corporate governance, corporate finance, FinTech, real estate and ESG. His
ongoing research examines the impact of robo advising on asset management, introduction
of credit default swaps on REITs governance, and director expertise on various corporate
decisions. He has published his research in journal such as Journal of Corporate Finance,
International Review of Finance, Journal of Real Estate Economics and Finance, Journal of Asset
Management, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance and others.
Yeonji No (PhD, Georgia Institute of Technology) is an Adjunct Faculty member of the
Lucas College of Business at San Jose State University. Her research include innovation,
science and engineering workforce, and science and technology policy. Her research has
been published in Nature Biotechnology.

231

